设置F_SEAL_WRITE后，为什么不能创建只读的共享映射？

Question

After doing fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE); , calls like mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, memfd, 0); fail with error EPERM . Based on man 2 fcntl , my understanding of F_SEAL_WRITE is that it only prevents writable, shared mappings. Similarly, if I do the fcntl while I have such a read-only memory map, it fails with error EBUSY like I'd only expect it to if the map were writable. Why is this happening?

MCVE:

#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>

int main(void) {
    void *buf;
    int memfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "foo", 2 /* MFD_ALLOW_SEALING */);
    ftruncate(memfd, 4096);
    buf = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, memfd, 0);
    fcntl(memfd, 1033 /* F_ADD_SEALS */, 8 /* F_SEAL_WRITE */); // will fail
    munmap(buf, 4096);
    fcntl(memfd, 1033 /* F_ADD_SEALS */, 8 /* F_SEAL_WRITE */);
    buf = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, memfd, 0); // will fail
    return 0;
}

When ran under strace (on Linux 4.4.0-135-generic from Ubuntu 16.04), it produces this:

memfd_create("foo", MFD_ALLOW_SEALING)  = 3
ftruncate(3, 4096)                      = 0
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 3, 0) = 0x7fd9a9865000
fcntl(3, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE)     = -1 EBUSY (Device or resource busy)
munmap(0x7fd9a9865000, 4096)            = 0
fcntl(3, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE)     = 0
mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 3, 0) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)

Answer 1

From man 2 fcntl :

Using the F_ADD_SEALS operation to set the F_SEAL_WRITE seal will fail with EBUSY if any writable, shared mapping exists.

Your mmap doesn't seem to create a writable mapping, so this shouldn't apply. The man page may be in error.

But, below the actual kernel code [top level]. Most of the following comes from mm/memfd.c .

You can get EBUSY from either mapping_deny_writable or memfd_wait_for_pins .

My best guess is that either the mmap bumps the count so mapping_deny_writable fails or ftruncate has some mappings that pin things.

From the latter, it appears that the pinning can be relieved [after some time], so spinning on the EBUSY error a few times may help.

---

static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int seals)
{
    struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
    unsigned int *file_seals;
    int error;

    /*
     * SEALING
     * Sealing allows multiple parties to share a tmpfs or hugetlbfs file
     * but restrict access to a specific subset of file operations. Seals
     * can only be added, but never removed. This way, mutually untrusted
     * parties can share common memory regions with a well-defined policy.
     * A malicious peer can thus never perform unwanted operations on a
     * shared object.
     *
     * Seals are only supported on special tmpfs or hugetlbfs files and
     * always affect the whole underlying inode. Once a seal is set, it
     * may prevent some kinds of access to the file. Currently, the
     * following seals are defined:
     *   SEAL_SEAL: Prevent further seals from being set on this file
     *   SEAL_SHRINK: Prevent the file from shrinking
     *   SEAL_GROW: Prevent the file from growing
     *   SEAL_WRITE: Prevent write access to the file
     *
     * As we don't require any trust relationship between two parties, we
     * must prevent seals from being removed. Therefore, sealing a file
     * only adds a given set of seals to the file, it never touches
     * existing seals. Furthermore, the "setting seals"-operation can be
     * sealed itself, which basically prevents any further seal from being
     * added.
     *
     * Semantics of sealing are only defined on volatile files. Only
     * anonymous tmpfs and hugetlbfs files support sealing. More
     * importantly, seals are never written to disk. Therefore, there's
     * no plan to support it on other file types.
     */

    if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
        return -EPERM;
    if (seals & ~(unsigned int)F_ALL_SEALS)
        return -EINVAL;

    inode_lock(inode);

    file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
    if (!file_seals) {
        error = -EINVAL;
        goto unlock;
    }

    if (*file_seals & F_SEAL_SEAL) {
        error = -EPERM;
        goto unlock;
    }

    if ((seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) && !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)) {
        error = mapping_deny_writable(file->f_mapping);
        if (error)
            goto unlock;

        error = memfd_wait_for_pins(file->f_mapping);
        if (error) {
            mapping_allow_writable(file->f_mapping);
            goto unlock;
        }
    }

    *file_seals |= seals;
    error = 0;

unlock:
    inode_unlock(inode);
    return error;
}

---

Here is mapping_deny_writable :

static inline int mapping_deny_writable(struct address_space *mapping)
{
    return atomic_dec_unless_positive(&mapping->i_mmap_writable) ?
        0 : -EBUSY;
}

---

Here is memfd_wait_for_pins :

/*
 * Setting SEAL_WRITE requires us to verify there's no pending writer. However,
 * via get_user_pages(), drivers might have some pending I/O without any active
 * user-space mappings (eg., direct-IO, AIO). Therefore, we look at all pages
 * and see whether it has an elevated ref-count. If so, we tag them and wait for
 * them to be dropped.
 * The caller must guarantee that no new user will acquire writable references
 * to those pages to avoid races.
 */
static int memfd_wait_for_pins(struct address_space *mapping)
{
    struct radix_tree_iter iter;
    void __rcu **slot;
    pgoff_t start;
    struct page *page;
    int error, scan;

    memfd_tag_pins(mapping);

    error = 0;
    for (scan = 0; scan <= LAST_SCAN; scan++) {
        if (!radix_tree_tagged(&mapping->i_pages, MEMFD_TAG_PINNED))
            break;

        if (!scan)
            lru_add_drain_all();
        else if (schedule_timeout_killable((HZ << scan) / 200))
            scan = LAST_SCAN;

        start = 0;
        rcu_read_lock();
        radix_tree_for_each_tagged(slot, &mapping->i_pages, &iter,
                       start, MEMFD_TAG_PINNED) {

            page = radix_tree_deref_slot(slot);
            if (radix_tree_exception(page)) {
                if (radix_tree_deref_retry(page)) {
                    slot = radix_tree_iter_retry(&iter);
                    continue;
                }

                page = NULL;
            }

            if (page &&
                page_count(page) - page_mapcount(page) != 1) {
                if (scan < LAST_SCAN)
                    goto continue_resched;

                /*
                 * On the last scan, we clean up all those tags
                 * we inserted; but make a note that we still
                 * found pages pinned.
                 */
                error = -EBUSY;
            }

            xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages);
            radix_tree_tag_clear(&mapping->i_pages,
                         iter.index, MEMFD_TAG_PINNED);
            xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages);
continue_resched:
            if (need_resched()) {
                slot = radix_tree_iter_resume(slot, &iter);
                cond_resched_rcu();
            }
        }
        rcu_read_unlock();
    }

    return error;
}