GitHub 操作 - 空环境机密

Question

I've started playing with GitHub actions, but I'm struggling with accessing repository secrets which I pass as env's.

My workflow file:

name: Invite

on: 
  pull_request:
    branches: [master]
    types: [closed]
jobs:
  invite:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Hello world action
        uses: lekterable/inclusive-organization-action@master
        env:
          SECRET_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SECRET_TOKEN }}
          organization: string
          SUPER_SECRET: ${{ secrets.SUPER_SECRET }}

action index file

const core = require('@actions/core')
const github = require('@actions/github')

const run = async () => {
  try {
    ...
    console.log('env', process.env)
    const token = process.env.SECRET_TOKEN
    const secret = process.env.SUPER_SECRET
    const organization = process.env.organization
    console.log('organization', organization)
    console.log('token?', !!token)
    console.log('secret?', !!secret)
    console.log('token length', token.length)
    ...
  } catch (error) {
    core.setFailed(error.message)
  }
}

run()

as you can see I'm passing 3 env's, the organization which has a value of 'string' exists as expected, but SECRET_TOKEN and SUPER_SECRET are empty.

And yes, I do have the secrets set in the repo which runs the action:

Is there something that I'm doing wrong?

Answer 1

Update

While the original answer below does still apply to public repositories, there are a couple of new updates that may help for some use cases.

• If your repository is private, you can now enable workflows from forks.

• If your repository is public, there is a new pull_request_target event that is not subject to any token restrictions.

Original Answer

The reason you are experiencing this behaviour is because the Invite workflow is being triggered by a pull request from a forked repository.

With the exception of GITHUB_TOKEN, secrets are not passed to the runner when a workflow is triggered from a forked repository.

When this happens, the actor of the workflow is the user that opened the pull request. If that user doesn't have write access to your repository then they cannot use secrets (other than GITHUB_TOKEN ).

Anyone with write access to a repository can create, read, and use secrets.

ref: https://help.github.com/en/actions/automating-your-workflow-with-github-actions/creating-and-using-encrypted-secrets#using-encrypted-secrets-in-a-workflow

If you run this step in your workflow you will see that it has nothing to do with your action. The TEST_SECRET secret won't be available in the workflow either.

      - name: Test
        env:
          TEST_GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          TEST_SECRET: ${{ secrets.TEST_SECRET }}
        run: |
          echo ${#TEST_GITHUB_TOKEN}
          echo ${#TEST_SECRET}

Checking the event data in the GitHub context you'll see that actor is the user that forked the repository and opened the pull request.

      - name: Dump GitHub context
        env:
          GITHUB_CONTEXT: ${{ toJson(github) }}
        run: echo "$GITHUB_CONTEXT"

This is a different but related issue answered by a GitHub staff member where it's explained that these limitations on forked repositories exist to "prevent malicious actors from using actions to poison upstream or downstream repos."

Answer 2

I've found a solution, what I did to work around it is instead of running the action on closing the PR I'm running it on a new commit on master, this has to be triggered by someone with 'write rights' to the repo, therefore, it has access to the repo secrets.

It's a bit harder to check if the commit is a merge commit and we have to explicitly fetch more info about the PR, but it works. Source code of an action I was trying to build if someone is interested: https://github.com/lekterable/inclusive-organization-action

Answer 3

I have implemented a workaround documented in https://stackoverflow.com/a/61450807/177275 to solve these types of problems. Essentially an action that runs on PR creates some artifacts, and later a cron job that runs every 5 minutes scans for those artifacts and acts on them. I use it to post build results to the pull request page as comments, but you can adapt the same approach for other use cases.

Answer 4

To achieve expected result, use Github action toolkit packages ie @actions/core

const core = require('@actions/core');
//myToken: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }
const myToken = core.getInput('myToken');

Please refer this links for more details https://github.com/actions/toolkit/pull/131/commits/87bfae207900deafa6d0f4013761df37835c433f https://github.com/actions/toolkit
https://github.com/actions/toolkit/blob/master/packages/core