PHP双重随机hmac验证，防止时序攻击

Question

防止哈希字符串比较的计时攻击的一种方法是执行额外的 HMAC 签名以随机化验证过程（请参阅https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2011 /february/double-hmac-verification/ ）。

除了每个散列的第二个 HMAC 散列之外，随机长度的随机盐被添加到两者中，以使散列时间/过程更难以预测。

我对此的实现如下所示：

function hmac_verify ($hash_original, $message, $key) {

    $hmac_salt = '...'; // was added at the original HMAC signing
    $random_salt = openssl_random_pseudo_bytes (rand(16,96));

    $raw_hash = hash_hmac('sha512', $message . $hmac_salt, $key, true);
    $hash_compare = base64_encode ($raw_hash); // $hash_original is in base64 
    $hash_compare_safe = hash_hmac('sha512', $hash_compare, $random_salt, true);
    $hash_original_safe = hash_hmac('sha512', $hash_original, $random_salt, true);

    if ($hash_compare_safe === $hash_original_safe) return true;
        else return false;

}

解密密文后，为了验证解密结果，以这种方式调用该函数：

if (!hmac_verify ($hmac_hash, $plaintext . $cipher_text, $key . $iv)) return "HASH ERROR";

这会成功阻止定时攻击吗？ 我有没有做不必要的事情？ 有什么可以改进的吗？

第二个问题是对明文、密文或两者（如我的示例）执行 HMAC 验证是否更可取，以及为什么。

Answer 1

在阅读您的函数时，我已经内联留下了一些评论。 这不是在阅读整篇文章后的分析，而是我在阅读时立即想到的。

function hmac_verify ($hash_original, $message, $key) {
    ##
    # Nitpick: A variable named $hash_original will prime people who read
    # your code to think of simple hash functions rather than HMAC
    ##

    $hmac_salt = '...'; // was added at the original HMAC signing
    ##
    # What is this? $hmac_salt? Looks like a hard coded-salt (a.k.a. pepper).
    # I wouldn't trust this with my life.
    ##

    $random_salt = openssl_random_pseudo_bytes (rand(16,96));
    ##
    # Why are you bothering to randomize this? Just use a static value
    # approximating the output size of the hash function (i.e. 64).
    ##

    $raw_hash = hash_hmac('sha512', $message . $hmac_salt, $key, true);
    $hash_compare = base64_encode ($raw_hash); // $hash_original is in base64 
    $hash_compare_safe = hash_hmac('sha512', $hash_compare, $random_salt, true);
    ##
    # Ah, yeah, don't pepper. HMAC is secure.
    ##
    $hash_original_safe = hash_hmac('sha512', $hash_original, $random_salt, true);

    if ($hash_compare_safe === $hash_original_safe) return true;
        else return false;
    ##
    # Why not just do this?
    # return $hash_compare_safe === $hash_original_safe;
    ## 

}

因此，我强烈建议将其分为两种不同的机制：一种用于计算 MAC，另一种在恒定时间内比较字符串（如 PHP 5.6 的hash_equals()所做的那样）。

function hmac_verify ($hmac, $message, $key)
{
    $calc = hash_hmac('sha512', $message, $key, true);
    return hmac_equals($hmac, $calc);
}

function hmac_equals($hmac, $calc)
{
    $random = openssl_random_pseudo_bytes(64);
    return (
        hash_hmac('sha512', $hmac, $random)
            ===
        hash_hmac('sha512', $calc, $random)
    );
}